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ABSTRACT 
 
A federal district court in Virginia recently held that 
Twitter users have no privacy rights regarding non-content 
information associated with their use of Twitter. The court 
thus affirmed that the government may obtain Twitter 
users’ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses without notice to 
the users. The users in this case were alleged to be 
members of WikiLeaks. The government obtained an order 
of production in connection with grand jury proceedings, 
compelling Twitter to turn over IP address data to the 
government. After Twitter motioned to have the order 
unsealed, the alleged WikiLeaks members unsuccessfully 
attempted to intervene to quash the order of production. 
The district court found that the users lacked standing to 
challenge the order under the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA) because Twitter’s terms of use negated any 
expectations of privacy and the nature of IP address data 
itself requires that users convey IP addresses and 
associated information in order to use the Internet. This 
Article examines the court’s decision and analysis under 
the SCA and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and 
discusses the impact of expanded warrantless disclosures 
of non-content electronic records. 
* Daniel Shickich, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2013.  
Thank you to Professor Jane Winn, University of Washington School of Law, 
Peter Winn, United States Department of Justice, and student editor Bryan 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
More Americans are using social media to communicate than 
ever before, and using a wide array of devices, from personal 
computers to cellular phones, to do so. Online social networking 
sites—such as Twitter, Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, and 
FourSquare—are ubiquitous. For example, Twitter use is 
increasingly prevalent among nearly every demographic group in 
the United States. A 2011 Pew Research survey found that 13 
percent of adults that use the Internet use Twitter.1 The survey also 
found pronounced growth in the number of non-white Twitter 
users, as well as significant growth in the number of Twitter users 
age 25-44.2 Such trends appear consistent with the growth of 
online social media in general; as of 2011, 65 percent of online 
adults used social networking sites such as MySpace, Facebook, or 
1 Aaron Smith, Twitter Update 2011, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, June 1, 
2011, http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/2007/twitter-users-cell-phone-2011-
demographics. 
2 Id. 
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LinkedIn.3 Considering that in February 2005, only 8 percent of 
adult Internet users used social networking sites, the pace of 
growth for online social networking site is “staggering.”4 
Unlike email messages and other predecessors to modern social 
media, communications through online social media are often 
publicly available—at least to other members of the social 
network. The public nature of many online social networks reduces 
or eliminates any expectation of privacy as to the content of the 
messages themselves. Government entities pursuing evidence of 
criminal activity through the records of online social networking 
sites do not always seek the actual content of the communications, 
but rather seek the non-content data—including the identity and 
location of the user. As a result, questions regarding privacy and 
government access to electronic non-content records arise relating 
to the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
(2010). Because non-content data,5 such as an Internet Protocol 
(IP) address, is necessary for communication via the Internet, 
many social networking companies routinely retain such 
information. 
A federal district court in Virginia recently held that the federal 
government may obtain Twitter users’ Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses without notice to the users. This decision represents a 
3 Mary Madden & Kathryn Zickuhr, 65% of Online Adults Use Social 
Networking Sites, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Aug. 26, 2011, 
http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites/Overview.aspx. 
4 Id. 
5 Non-content information has been described as “the envelope information 
needed to deliver a communication from one location to another.” WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. § 
4.4(D) (3d ed. 2011). Under the SCA, non-content information includes:  
(A) name; (B) address; (C) local and long distance telephone 
connection records, or records of session times and durations; 
(D) length of service (including start date) and types of service 
utilized; (E) telephone or instrument number or other 
subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily 
assigned network address; and (F) means and source of 
payment for such service (including any credit card or bank 
account number).”  
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2010); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. § 4.8(C) (3d ed. 2011). 
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natural application of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
applying the SCA. Further, the decision gives notice to both users 
and operators of social networks that there is no expectation of 
privacy for IP address data transmitted over the Internet—even 
when the data is transmitted from a personal computer located in a 
private space. 
This Article examines the federal district court’s decision and 
analysis under SCA and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Then, 
this Article discusses the impact of expanded warrantless 
disclosures of non-content electronic records on online social 
networking sites and users. The Article concludes by noting that 
the nature of online communication itself requires that non-content 
data be disclosed between machines, meaning that under the SCA, 
certain data required for using the Internet is inherently non-
private. 
 
I. TWITTER AND NON-CONTENT DATA 
 
A.  Twitter 
 
Twitter is an online social media network that allows users to 
post short messages to one another or to the public. The company’s 
website states, “Twitter is a real-time information network that 
connects [users] to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news 
about what [users] find interesting.”6 Twitter users communicate 
using “tweets.” Each tweet is up to 140 characters long; users can 
share photos, videos and conversations directly in tweets.7 Twitter 
allows users to post tweets and read the tweets of other users via 
computers and other mobile devices that connect to the Internet. 
Users can monitor, or “follow,” other users’ tweets, and can permit 
or forbid access to their own tweets. In addition to posting their 
own tweets, users may send messages to a single user (“direct 
messages”) or repost other users’ tweets (“retweet”). Each Twitter 
user has a unique username, which is associated with that user’s 
6 About Twitter, TWITTER.COM, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 3, 
2013). 
7 Id. 
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tweets, direct messages, and retweets.8 
Twitter requires that users agree to a “clickwrap”9 agreement 
that includes agreeing to Twitter’s Terms of Service and Privacy 
Policy as a condition of creating a Twitter account.10 The Privacy 
Policy includes a number of key terms and conditions that relate to 
retention of user data. For example, the Privacy Policy as of May 
17, 2012 explained that, “We may preserve or disclose your 
information if we believe that it is reasonably necessary to comply 
with a law, regulation or legal request; to protect the safety of any 
person; to address fraud, security or technical issues; or to protect 
Twitter's rights or property.”11 Additionally, the Policy states that:  
Our servers automatically record information ("Log 
Data") created by your use of the Services. Log 
Data may include information such as your IP 
address, browser type, operating system, the 
referring web page, pages visited, location, your 
mobile carrier, device and application IDs, search 
terms, and cookie information. We receive Log 
Data when you interact with our Services, for 
example, when you visit our websites, sign into our 
Services, interact with our email notifications, use 
your Twitter account to authenticate to a third-party 
website or application, or visit a third-party website 
that includes a Twitter button or widget. Twitter 
uses Log Data to provide our Services and to 
measure, customize, and improve them. If not 
8 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 118 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (internal footnotes 
omitted); see also Rafe Needleman, Newbie’s guide to Twitter, CNET, March 
15, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/newbies-guide-to-twitter/. 
9 In computer software, hardware, and Internet transactions terms and 
conditions are often contained in a clickwrap agreement—terms and conditions 
that appear on the computer screen when the user attempts to install the software 
or use the website and require that a consumer agree to the license terms before 
being allowed to purchase or use the product or website. 15B AM. JUR. 2D 
Computers and the Internet § 105 (2012). 
10 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 118. 
11 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, May 17, 2012, http://twitter.com/ 
privacy. 
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already done earlier, for example, as provided 
below for Widget Data, we will either delete Log 
Data or remove any common account identifiers, 
such as your username, full IP address, or email 
address, after 18 months.12 
Users must acknowledge and agree to this Privacy Policy as a 
condition of using Twitter. 
 
B.  18 U.S.C. § 2703: Content or Non-Content Under the SCA 
 
Enacted as Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act of 1986,13 the SCA largely governs the methods and 
requirements for government access to electronically stored 
communications and the data related to those communications. The 
SCA draws an important distinction between content and non-
content information in Section 2703. In addition to establishing the 
procedures by which the government may obtain access to 
electronic communications and information, the section 
distinguishes between “contents” and non-content “records.”14  
The SCA distinguishes between content substance and form. 
When the government seeks “information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication” (in other 
words, content), paragraphs (a) and (b) apply.15 If, on the other 
hand, the government seeks non-content records, paragraph (c) 
controls.16 Section 2703, paragraph (c)(2) lists the type of non-
content data subject to disclosure, including the subscriber or 
12 Id. 
13 Pub.L. No. 99–508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2010)). The Electronic Privacy Act of 1986 was enacted 
in part to extend enhanced privacy protections to developing forms of 
telecommunications and computer technology, including cellular phones, 
pagers, and email. See S. Rep. No. 99–541 at 4 (1986), reprinted at 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559; see generally Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the 
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208,1209-13 (2008). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–
44 (1979).  
15 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(8), 2703(a)-(b), 2711(1) (2010).  
16 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c) (2010). 
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customer name, address, telephone connection records or records 
of session times and durations, length and type of service used, 
telephone number or temporarily assigned network address, and 
method of payment.17 “Although the line between [content and 
non-content] occasionally blurs, in most cases the line is clear: it is 
the line between a message that a person wants to communicate 
and information about when and how he does so.”18 Under the 
SCA, data associated with a subscriber or customer is non-content, 
whereas information contained in the communication itself is 
content. 
According to the SCA, a court order issued under 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(c) for non-content records “shall issue only if the 
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a 
wire or electronic communication, or the records or other 
information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing 
criminal investigation.”19 This court order is “something like a mix 
between a subpoena and a search warrant. . . . If the judge finds 
that the factual showing has been made, the judge signs the order. 
The order is then served like an ordinary subpoena . . .”20 The 
order does not require notification to the customer or subscriber 
when the government requests non-content records under 
paragraph (c).21 
 
II. IN RE APPLICATION OF THE U.S. FOR AN ORDER PURSUANT  
TO 18 U.S.C. §2703(D)22 
 
In a memorandum opinion issued on November 10, 2011, a 
federal district court judge in Virginia addressed the limitations of 
17 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2010). 
18 Kerr, supra note 13, 1228. 
19 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2010). 
20 Kerr, supra note 13, 1219. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(3) (2010). The requirements for accessing content 
information are far more complex and vary in part based on whether the content 
has been in “electronic storage” more or less than 180 days. See WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, 2 CRIM. PROC. § 
4.8(D) (3d ed. 2011). 
22 830 F. Supp. 2d 114 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011). 
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the Fourth Amendment right to privacy with regard to Internet 
communications. The opinion affirms a United States magistrate 
judge’s rulings regarding an order of production issued under the 
SCA that allowed the government to obtain non-content records 
regarding Twitter users without a warrant. Petitioners, three 
alleged members of the WikiLeaks organization23 facing potential 
criminal charges over public disclosure of classified information 
about the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, moved to quash the order, 
unseal the application seeking the order, and publicly docket other 
related information on a variety of grounds, including a 
constitutional claim based on the Fourth Amendment right to 
privacy. In denying petitioners’ motions, the judge noted that 
gaining online access requires all Internet users to transmit IP 
address information associated with their personal computing 
devices out of private home spaces and onto online routers that 
then convey traffic to specific websites. Combined with Twitter’s 
privacy policy, which resulted in application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s third-party doctrine, the nature of Internet data 
transmission led the judge to conclude that Twitter users have no 
expectation of privacy regarding the numerical IP addresses that 
identify their computers, cellular phones, or other mobile devices 
that connect to the Internet when using Twitter. 
 
A.  Factual Context 
 
As part of an ongoing criminal investigation into alleged leaks 
of classified United States military documents related to the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars, the federal government sought a court order 
based on 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) instructing Twitter, Inc. to turn over 
information pertaining to three individuals under grand jury 
investigation.24 The government alleged that the three 
23 WikiLeaks is an international, online, self-described “not-for-profit media 
organisation” that seeks to publish original source material and news stories 
based on information leaked from a variety of anonymous sources. About, 
WIKILEAKS.COM, http://wikileaks.org/About.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2013).  
24 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 117; Scott Shane & John F. Burns, 
U.S. Subpoenas Twitter Over WikiLeaks Supporters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/world/09wiki.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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individuals—Jacob Appelbaum, a resident and citizen of the 
United States and a computer security expert, Rop Gonggrijp, a 
Dutch citizen and a computer security expert, and Birgitta 
Jonsdottir, a citizen and resident of Iceland, and a member of the 
Icelandic parliament—acted as members of the Wikileaks 
organization and performed criminal acts related to the release of 
classified U.S. government documents.25 The three were alleged to 
be subscribers and users of Twitter, and used the Internet to 
communicate with the Twitter social networking site.26  
 
B.  Procedural Posture 
 
Upon ex parte application by the government, Magistrate 
Judge Theresa Carroll Buchanan issued an order instructing 
Twitter to produce specific electronic records to the government.27 
Twitter responded with a motion to unseal the order. On January 5, 
2011, based on Twitter’s motion and the government’s consent, the 
magistrate judge unsealed the order, finding that it was in the best 
interest of the investigation.28 The magistrate judge also authorized 
Twitter to disclose the order to Appelbaum, Gonggrijp, and 
Jonsdottir.29 
In response, the three individuals filed a motion to vacate the 
order, and a motion to unseal certain other court records pertaining 
to the order and publicly docket all orders issued under 18 U.S.C. § 
2703.30 The individuals based their motions on a variety of 
grounds, including a constitutional claim based on the Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy.31 
After briefing from both parties, Magistrate Judge Buchanan 
issued an order and memorandum opinion denying the motion to 
vacate, granting in part the motion to unseal, and keeping under 
25 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 117. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 121. 
28 Id. at 122. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 127. 
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advisement the issue of public docketing.32 In her memorandum 
opinion, Magistrate Judge Buchanan found that the individuals 
lacked standing to challenge the order, that issuance of the order 
was proper under the SCA, and that issuance of the order did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.33 Then, on June 1, 2011, 
Magistrate Judge Buchanan issued an order and memorandum 
opinion denying the request for public docketing.34 Appelbaum, 
Gonggrijp, and Jonsdottir filed objections to both orders.35 
 
C.  Building on Prior Precedent 
 
On November 10, 2011, Federal District Court Judge Liam 
O’Grady affirmed the rulings of Magistrate Judge Buchanan, 
finding that the individuals lacked statutory standing.36 The judge 
further found that the order of production issued under the SCA 
that allowed the government to obtain non-content Twitter 
information was valid, did not require a warrant, and did not 
violate any Fourth Amendment right to privacy.37 
In denying petitioners’ motions, Judge O’Grady noted that 
gaining online access requires all Internet users to transmit IP 
address information associated with their personal computing 
devices out of private home spaces and onto online routers that 
then convey traffic to specific websites.38 Combined with Twitter’s 
privacy policy, which resulted in application of the Fourth 
Amendment’s third-party doctrine, the nature of Internet data 
transmission led the judge to conclude that Twitter users have no 
expectation of privacy regarding the numerical IP addresses that 
identify their computers, cellular phones or other mobile devices 
that connect to the Internet when using Twitter.39 
The court first addressed locational privacy issues raised by the 
32 Id. at 122. 
33 Id. at 127. 
34 Id. at 122. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 128-29. 
37 Id. at 129-30, 138.  
38 Id. at 135. 
39 Id. at 138. 
                                                                                                             
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 8, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol8/iss4/2
2013] WHAT YOUR TWEET DOESN’T SAY 467 
possible use of non-content data. The court distinguished United 
States v. Karo,40 noting that the case at bar did not involve 
surveillance of something that had been withdrawn from view, but 
rather something that was transmitted from a private space into a 
public space, and that Twitter, not the government, recorded the 
information.41 That such information could be used to pinpoint the 
location of the user did not worry the court, as “[t]he Fourth 
Circuit has explicitly approved the collection of non-IP subscriber 
information” to pinpoint the location of a party.42 In essence, the 
court distinguished the facts of this case from those of Karo, 
focusing on the entity making the transmission and the entity 
recording the data. In addition, the court explained that, assuming 
arguendo that the government was able to track user movements 
based upon IP address data, “IP addresses are no more revealing 
about the contents of communication than are phone numbers.”43 
Just as the government “may be able to make educated guesses 
about what was said, simply based on non-content information 
about the parties involved in the communication” using telephone 
numbers, so too may the government perform similar guesswork 
with IP addresses.44 
The court then examined the impact of the third-party doctrine 
on the privacy claim. The court noted the history of the third-party 
doctrine, looking to United States v. Miller,45 and Smith v. 
Maryland.46 The court explained: 
Like the defendant in Smith [relied on the phone 
company to connect calls], Petitioners relied on 
Internet technology to access Twitter, indicating an 
intention to relinquish control of whatever 
information would be necessary to complete their 
communication. They knew that their 
communications with Twitter would be transmitted  
40 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
41 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 131-33. 
42 Id. at 133 (citing U.S. v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 164 n.2 (2010)). 
43 Id. at 138. 
44 Id. 
45 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
46 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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out of private spaces and onto the Internet for 
routing to Twitter.47  
Analogizing the defendant’s voluntary disclosure of information to 
the phone company when dialing a phone from within his home in 
Smith to the act of the petitioners in the case at bar in disclosing 
their IP addresses to Twitter, the court concluded that “[b]oth 
phone numbers and IP addresses must be revealed to 
intermediaries as a practical necessity of completing 
communications over their respective networks.”48  
The court pointed to two prior cases to support its conclusion 
that IP addresses are analogous to telephone numbers. In U.S. v. 
Christie, the defendant was convicted of possession of thousands 
of images of child pornography and of various child-pornography-
related offenses.49 The defendant appealed, based in part on an 
argument that the government's acquisition of his IP address 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights and thus evidence gathered 
related to his activity on a child pornography website should have 
been suppressed.50 The Third Circuit rejected this argument, 
analogizing an IP address to other subscriber information and 
holding that “no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP 
address.”51 Likewise, in United States v. Forrester, a defendant 
convicted of conspiracy to manufacture ecstasy and various other 
offenses related to the operation of a large ecstasy-manufacturing 
laboratory challenged the validity of a government computer 
surveillance program that enabled the government to learn, among 
other things, the IP addresses of the websites that he visited.52 
Comparing the gathering of IP address data with the use of a pen 
register in Smith,53 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
government’s actions were not a search within Fourth Amendment 
purposes.54  
47 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 135. 
48 Id. 
49 624 F.3d 558, 562 (3d Cir. 2010). 
50 Id. at 567. 
51 Id. at 574. 
52 512 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2007). 
53 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
54 Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510. 
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The court also distinguished the facts of the Twitter case from 
those of two other situations that courts have faced. First, the court 
noted that the petitioners reliance on United States v. Warshak55 
was misplaced because Warshak dealt with an order seeking 
emails—in other words, content.56 In contrast, the government 
sought only non-content records in the case at bar.57 Similarly, the 
Court concluded that United States v. Heckenkamp58 was 
“inapposite because the intrusion at issue [in Heckenkamp] was a 
remote search of the defendant's computer, which included running 
commands and examining files stored on the defendant's personal 
computer.”59 Whereas “[p]ersonal computers are ordinarily treated 
like closed containers under the Fourth Amendment,” the non-
content data the users transmitted to Twitter moved from a private 
space into a public space.60 
Thus, relying in large part on previous decisions, the Court 
determined Twitter users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the IP data transmitted as part of their communication with the 
website. 
 
III. IMPACT ON ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND USERS 
 
A.  Non-Content Data is Not Private or Protected 
 
Application of the SCA to social networking sites appears to 
limit any privacy interests that end users have in information 
conveyed to the social media service providers, at least in non-
content information. Under this court’s analysis, it does not appear 
that the Fourth Amendment would ever protect non-content 
information contained in or associated with IP addresses. As the 
Court states, “[The Petitioners] also implicitly consented to 
disclosure of their IP address information to Twitter as a practical 
55 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010). 
56 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
57 Id. 
58 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007). 
59 In re Application, 830 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
60 Id. 
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necessity of using Internet technology.”61 IP addresses are 
necessary to route communications over the Internet. Such a result 
is consistent with prior decisions and represents a natural 
expansion of prior precedent.62 The distinction between content 
and non-content, as well as the distinction between private and 
public spaces, remain firm. 
 The conclusions of others who have considered the application 
of the SCA to analogous situations also bolster this decision.63 
Because the nature of online communication requires disclosure of 
IP address data into public space and to a third party, even when 
transmitted from a personal computer located in a private space, 
social networking site users and operators should be on notice that 
no expectation of privacy exists in IP address data transmitted over 
the Internet. 
 
B.  Non-Content Data is Collected and Retained 
 
Social networking sites will continue to track and retain non-
content data, including IP address information. For example, both 
Twitter and Facebook include explicit messages about retaining IP 
address information in their respective privacy policies.64 Twitter 
61 Id. at 139. 
62 See e.g., U.S. v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); U.S. v. 
Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2007). 
63 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, 1210 (“[B]y communicating with their 
ISPs, Internet users have revealed information to their ISPs and have 
relinquished their Fourth Amendment rights in that information.”); People v. 
Malcolm Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. June 30, 2012). 
64 According to Twitter, “Our servers automatically record information (Log 
Data) created by your use of the Services. Log Data may include information 
such as your IP address, browser type, operating system, the referring web page, 
pages visited, location, your mobile carrier, device and application IDs, search 
terms, and cookie information.” Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, June 23, 
2011, http://twitter.com/privacy. Likewise, Facebook states, “We receive data 
from the computer, mobile phone or other device you use to access Facebook, 
including when multiple users log in from the same device. This may include 
your IP address and other information about things like your internet service, 
location, the type (including identifiers) of browser you use, or the pages you 
visit.” Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM, https://www.facebook.com/about/ 
privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
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informs users that in most cases it will only retain such data for 18 
months, after which it will either delete it or remove “common 
account identifiers” (such as username, full IP address, or email 
address);65 Facebook retains data until an account has been 
deleted.66  
That private companies are retaining non-content data does not 
appear to worry the court in this case. After noting that IP 
addresses are necessary to route communications over the Internet, 
the court continued: 
The fact that Twitter chose to record IP address 
information pertaining to [the Twitter users], and 
the purpose for which it did so, makes no 
difference. . . . As the Supreme Court stated in 
Smith [v. Maryland], the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be dictated by the record-
keeping practices of a private corporation. (“We are 
not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth 
Amendment, especially in circumstances where (as 
here) the pattern of protection would be dictated by 
billing practices of a private corporation.”).67 
Non-content data is necessarily transmitted and routinely retained. 
Social networking companies collect and retain non-content data 
because users necessarily provide it—making it pervasive and 
uniform. Non-content data helps companies provide more 
personalized service, and can be used to monetize social 
networking sites through targeted advertising. And regardless of 
why non-content data is retained, privacy interests found in the 
Fourth Amendment or the SCA do not protect it.  
 
65 Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER.COM, June 23, 2011, http://twitter.com/ 
privacy. 
66 Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK.COM, https://www.facebook.com/about/ 
privacy/your-info (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
67 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 137-38 (E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2011) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In deciding In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. §2703(d), a federal district court in Virginia affirmed 
that the federal government can legally obtain a Twitter user’s IP 
address and other non-content information associated with the user 
without first providing notice to the user. This decision represents 
a natural expansion of existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
applying the SCA, and gives both users and operators of social 
networking sites notice that there is no expectation of privacy for 
IP address data transmitted over the Internet—even when the data 
is transmitted from a personal computer located in a private space. 
The nature of online communication itself requires that machines 
disclose non-content data, meaning that under the SCA, the data 
required for using the Internet is inherently non-private. Internet 
users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the IP data and 
other non-content information they transmit as part of their 
communication with a website. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 All social networking companies should employ 
“clickwrap” agreements and/or privacy policies that put 
users on notice regarding the company’s retention of non-
content data. 
 Internet users should be aware that social networking sites 
(as well as a host of other sites) retain non-content data for 
a variety of purposes. 
 Courts will likely continue to analogize IP address 
information to telephone numbers when performing any 
Fourth Amendment analysis. 
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